A Defeasible Calculus for Zetetic Agents by Millson, Jared
A Defeasible Calculus for Zetetic Agents 1
Note: This is the Author’s Manuscript for a forthcoming article.
Please do not distribute without author’s permission.
Jared Millson
A Defeasible Calculus for Zetetic Agents
Abstract. The study of defeasible reasoning unites epistemologists with
those working in AI, in part, because both are interested in epistemic ra-
tionality. While it is traditionally thought to govern the formation and
(with)holding of beliefs, epistemic rationality may also apply to the inter-
rogative attitudes associated with our core epistemic practice of inquiry,
such as wondering, investigating, and curiosity. Since generally intelligent
systems should be capable of rational inquiry, AI researchers have a nat-
ural interest in the norms that govern interrogative attitudes. Following
its recent coinage, we use the term “zetetic” to refer to the properties and
norms associated with the capacity to inquire. In this paper, we argue
that zetetic norms can be modeled via defeasible inferences to and from
questions—a.k.a erotetic inferences—in a manner similar to the way norms
of epistemic rationality are represented by defeasible inference rules. We
offer a sequent calculus that accommodates the unique features of “erotetic
defeat" and that exhibits the computational properties needed to inform the
design of zetetic agents. The calculus presented here is an improved version
of the one presented in Millson (2019), extended to cover a new class of
defeasible erotetic inferences.
Keywords: Inquiry; Erotetic Logic; Defeasible Reasoning; Logical AI
1. Agents, Rationality, and Inquiry
The study and modeling of defeasible reasoning unites epistemologists
with those working in artificial intelligence (AI). This convergence is due,
in part, to a joint interest in epistemic rationality. Traditionally, epistem-
ically rational behavior is conceived in terms of conformity with rules,
standards, or ideals specifying the conditions under which an agent is
permitted (or obliged) to form or withhold beliefs. Since these norms are
commonly understood as admitting exceptions or conflicts, the concept
of defeasibility has occupied an important role in their study. Epistemic
rationality is thus often identified with the defeasible inferences an agent
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is (epistemically) permitted to draw. Naturally, this is especially relevant
to work in AI, where the goal is, inter alia, the construction of artificial
agents capable of operating with a range of information sources in an
epistemically rational manner.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that epistemic rationality
only governs the formation or withholding of beliefs. In recent years,
epistemologists and philosophers of science have come to recognize an
array of non-doxastic or quasi-doxastic states and processes that are
subject to epistemic norms (Fleisher, 2018; Friedman, 2013; Lacey, 2015;
Palmira, 2019; Whitcomb, 2017). These include, most notably, the atti-
tudes associated with our core epistemic practice of inquiry.
An inquiring agent aims to improve its epistemic standing with re-
spect to some subject-matter—i.e. to obtain, in some sense, the correct
answer to a question—and undertakes certain actions in order to do
so, e.g. gathering evidence. But since it is possible to perform those
same actions so as to mislead others into thinking that one is inquiring,
these actions cannot be sufficient. To qualify as genuinely inquiring into
an issue, an agent must have an interrogative attitude that is oriented
toward settling the question at hand and that is sensitive to information
bearing on it (Friedman, 2013). In contrast with propositional attitudes
like belief, the contents of these attitudes are questions. Interrogative
attitudes include wondering, being curious, investigating, contemplating,
deliberating, and suspending judgment about Q. In what follows, we use
the verb-phrase “inquiring into Q” as a place-holder for any one of these
attitudes. One way to think about the epistemic norms that govern
inquiry, then, is to consider when it is epistemically rational for an agent
to adopt an interrogative attitude toward a question, i.e. to inquire into
Q. Following Friedman (in press), we’ll refer to the norms that govern
these attitudes and to the rationality they embody as zetetic from the
ancient Greek word for inquiry, zêtêsis.
Unfortunately, this new line of research has yet to make full contact
with the field of AI, despite the latter’s obvious interest in developing
systems that perform information-seeking operations. Intelligent agents
are able, e.g., to search for relevant information at appropriate intervals
and to ‘raise’ or ‘drop’ questions in response to changes in information
states. Behaviors such as these may serve as an intermediate step toward
an agent’s goal of maximizing some external reward. But inquisitive be-
havior and the states underlying it can play other roles as well. For
instance, in environments where extrinsic rewards are scarce, interrog-
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ative attitudes such as curiosity can serve as intrinsic reward signals,
encouraging the agent to explore its environment, develop successful
strategies, and learn useful skills (Burda et al., 2018; Graziano et al.,
2011; Pape et al., 2012; Pathak, Agrawal, Efros, & Darrell, 2017).
Among the areas where such artificially curious agents might have
a significant impact is in the automation of scientific discovery (Savage,
2012). Autonomous agents capable of scientific activity will need to
be able to determine which lines of inquiry are worth pursuing. So,
automating these decisions via artificial curiosity is likely to be central
to the project of automating scientific activity in general. Extending the
study of epistemic rationality to the behavior and attitudes associated
with inquiry is therefore important for epistemologists and AI researchers
alike.
Typically, defeasible inferences are understood along the lines of the
“If-Then-Unless” pattern, where conclusions (the ‘Then’ part) are drawn
‘usually’, ‘normally’, or ‘by default’ when certain information is present
(the ‘If’ part) but are withheld, relinquished, or bracketed when infor-
mation defeating that inference is detected (the ‘Unless’ part).1 An
agent who draws such inferences in the presence of defeaters exhibits,
ceteris paribus, a sort of incoherence, such as that associated with having
inconsistent beliefs or adopting incompatible doxastic attitudes toward
the same content. If epistemic rationality is generally associated with
defeasible inferences, then we would expect zetetic rationality to be sim-
ilarly defeasible. But what collateral states would make it irrational or
incoherent for an agent to adopt an interrogative attitude like wondering
whether p?
Linguistic practice provides a clue. A speaker who asks a question
often flouts conversational maxims when it is common knowledge that
it knows or fully believes the answer.2 Of course, it is often quite useful
and even necessary to flout such maxims in order to achieve certain
communicative goals, e.g. to feign ignorance. But the dialectical pro-
scription on asking information-seeking questions for which one has the
answer may reveal a distinctly epistemic norm. The suggestion that
has recently emerged is that it is epistemically irrational, at least prima
facie, to adopt interrogative attitudes toward questions whose answer is
(already) believed or known. Stated more carefully, an agent’s epistemic
1See Blöser, Janvid, Matthiessen, and Willaschek (2013) for a nice discussion of the
extensive literature on defeasibility across logic, epistemology, and law.
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license or entitlement to inquire into a question is defeated when it knows
or is licensed to believe its answer (Friedman, 2017a, 2017b; Whitcomb,
2017). To give zetetic rationality its due, this erotetic defeat needs to
be investigated alongside the kinds of defeat that are traditionally rep-
resented in nonomonotonic logics.
The goal of this paper is to lay the ground for a formal study of zetetic
rationality that is of recognizable import to epistemologists—at least to
those who work in the formal and logical areas of that field—as well as
to AI researchers. To do so, we examine defeasible inferences involving
the contents of interrogative attitudes, i.e. questions, in addition to
the contents of doxastic attitudes, i.e. propositions. The former have
traditionally been the subject matter of erotetic logic. What we propose,
then, is a defeasible erotetic logic with the computational properties
needed to inform the design of zetetically intelligent systems.
We draw on work in Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL), as it pro-
vides a familiar truth-conditional semantics for erotetic inferences and
identifies some of them as nonmonotonic (Wiśniewski, 2013; Wiśniewski,
1995). While the relations between questions and answers have received
various logical treatments (Belnap & Steel, 1976; Ciardelli, Groenendijk,
& Roelofsen, 2018; Hamblin, 1958; Hintikka, 2007), IEL is rather unique
in its focus on inferences among questions themselves. IEL’s approach is
to start with a standard propositional language and to enrich it syntac-
tically with question-forming vocabulary. Following the set-of-answers
methodology, IEL represents questions as sets of their possible direct
answers, with the latter being construed as syntactically distinct, well-
formed formulas (wffs) of the propositional language. In virtue of this
capacious construal of questions, IEL can readily accommodate the pop-
ular intensional semantics for natural language interrogatives that treats
questions (i.e. the content of interrogative clauses) as partitions of log-
ical space (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1996). In recent years, the logical
study of questions has benefited from the rise of inquisitive semantics,
a program which, unlike IEL, does not assume a syntactic distinction
between declaratives and interrogatives but rather provides a unified
semantic account according to which informative content may be dis-
tinguished from inquisitive content. Fortunately, many of the relations
2 One obvious exception is when a speaker asks a so-called “exam question” and
intends to test the addressee’s knowledge.
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IEL studies have known correlates in inquisitive semantics (Wiśniewski
& Leszczyńska-Jasion, 2015).
What we want is a calculus that facilitates (re)construction of reason-
ing in which interrogative attitudes are adopted and abandoned. IEL is a
good resource for this, given that some of its relations are nonmonotonic.
Unfortunately, there has been very little proof theoretic work done with
erotetic logics, let alone IEl. The few calculi that exist for species of
IEL’s relations either do not encode defeasibility (Leszczyńska-Jasion,
Urbański, & Wiśniewski, 2013; Leszczyńska-Jasion, 2008; Wiśniewski,
2004, 2016), or do not capture the type of defeasible erotetic inferences
that take questions as both premises and conclusion (Meheus, 1999, 2001;
Millson, 2019). In fact, the calculus presented in Millson (2019), LK?,
cannot capture these inferences at all. The limitation arises from the fact
that sequents in LK? contain an auxiliary syntactic parameter—so-called
“Background Sets”—that preserve a ‘trace’ of active formulas that are
otherwise eliminated as the proof proceeds downward. Although they
greatly aid the proof of a cut-elimination theorem, these background
sets prevent the representation of erotetic defeat in cases of question-to-
question inferences and produce a significant syntactic ‘bloat,’ since the
size of background sets increases dramatically through the course of a
proof.3 The system presented here does away with the background-set
device and offers a far more streamlined and elegant calculus—one that
is shown to be sound and complete without the use of a cut rule.
Filling this proof-theroetic lacuna is a central aim of the present
work. We offer a decidable sequent calculus that is sound and complete
for IEL’s defeasible erotetic-inferential relations. The calculus includes
introduction and elimination rules for interrogative-forming expressions
that correspond, intuitively, to the adoption of interrogative attitudes.
We hope, then, to have an (informally) well-founded and (formally) well-
behaved calculus for studying zetetically rational agents.
The system presented here might aid the engineering and design of
such agents. For instance, if the logic is decidable for proofs of defea-
sible inferences between questions, then an automated theorem prover
(ATP) could help agents determine which auxiliary or subordinate ques-
tions they are epistemically permitted to inquire into given their initial
question(s) and knowledge base. Since the inferences are erotetically
3In Millson (2019), the background-set device facilitates the proof of the property
established in Lemma 3 below.
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defeasible, the ATP could also be used to tell the agent when it has
obtained an answer to one of its questions and thus is no longer licensed
to inquire. Such an ATP could nicely complement the reinforcement
learning of artificially curious agents.
The paper proceeds by introducing IEL’s semantic definitions for two
types of erotetic inference (§2). Next, we define a sequent calculus for
the language of classical propositional logic (CPL) that tracks the defeat
of sequents on the basis of a finite set of defeaters assigned to each atom
by the axioms (§3.1). We then extend the calculus with rules for erotetic
formulas (§3.3) and show that the calculus is decidable and is sound and
complete for IEL’s defeasible erotetic inference-relations (§4). We finish
with a worked example (§5) and some suggestions for future development
(§6).
2. Erotetic Inferences
Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL) studies the relations underwriting two
patterns of reasoning in which questions play a crucial role. The first
occurs when information ‘opens up’ or makes salient a set of possibili-
ties, each of which provides a possible answer to a particular question.
In these situations, we might say that our state of information, set of
beliefs, or theoretical commitments gives rise to or evokes a question.
For example, knowing that someone broke the vase may give rise to
the question of who, among a certain set of individuals, broke it. It’s
natural to think of our reasoning here as one of inferring questions from
statements. But we also infer questions from other questions. We may
find that progress can be made in answering one question by answering
another. If we are trying to figure out who broke the vase and we have ev-
idence that whoever broke it is wearing sandals, we can narrow down the
set of potential culprits by asking who of them is wearing sandals. Here,
our initial question, together with our evidence regarding the culprit’s
footwear, form the premises from which we infer the latter question. The
first of these patterns is called question or erotetic evocation, the second,
erotetic implication (hereafter: e-implication).
Evocation and e-implication specify conditions under which an agent
is entitled to ask or inquire into a question, in the sense of adopting an
interrogative attitude. By contrast, erotetic defeat describes a situation
in which an agent is not licensed or is forbidden to inquire into a question.
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So evocation and e-implication are undermined when an agent has an
answer to the relevant questions. In drawing one of these types of infer-
ence, agents reserve the right, so to speak, to retract or withhold their
entitlement to inquire in the light of further evidence, i.e. if they obtain
the answers to their questions. Evocation, for instance, fails to obtain
when the declarative premises entail an answer to the evoked question.
Similarly, e-implication may fail when the premises entail an answer to
the initial (i.e. implying) question. Since an agent may deploy these
inference-patterns only insofar as it doesn’t already have the answers
to its questions, IEL provides inferential relations that conform to our
intuitions about erotetic defeat.
Initially proposed by Andrzej Wiśniewski, Inferential Erotetic
Logic (IEL) offers a generalized semantic account of evocation and e-
implication. Since our aim is to develop a proof theory for these in-
ferences with the prospects of implementation—.e.g. in the form of an
automated theorem prover—we will be concerned with the expression of
these inferences in a familiar logical language, namely, that of classical
propositional logic (CPL). We focus on what is known in IEL as “regu-
lar" e-implication, which is transitive. Doing so allows us to formulate a
calculus that can be equipped with a cut rule that applies to either d-
wffs or e-wffs. In the conclusion, we propose an extension of the calculus
that covers these non-regular inferences.
Let L be a formal language composed of two disjoint fragments. The
first, Ld, consists of declarative well-formed formulas (hereafter: ‘d-wffs’
or ‘statements’); the second, Le, consists of interrogative formulas (here-
after: ‘e-wffs’ or ‘questions’). The “declarative part” of L, i.e. Ld,
is the language of classical propositional logic (CPL) with a countable
set of atoms, A, which are denoted p, q, r, s, t, u, v, sometimes with sub-
scripts. Arbitrary d-wffs are represented by A,B,C,D, (possibly empty)
sets of d-wffs by X,Υ, Z, and (possibly empty) sets of sets of d-wffs by
S,T,U,V—each may be indexed with the help of subscripts.
The “erotetic” part of L, is formed by enriching Ld with “?,” “{ ,”
“},” and the comma—thus yielding e-wffs such as ?{p∧q, r∨q,¬p}. The
metavariables Q,R range over e-wffs. We refer to the d-wffs from which
questions are formed as their direct answers and will use d(·) to denote
the function that maps questions to the set of their direct answers. So,
when Q =?{p,¬q}, dQ = {p,¬q}. We stipulate that card(dQ) ≥ 2 for
any Q ∈ L. The metavariables F,G,H range over formulas and Γ,∆
over sets of formulas of either type (i.e. statements or questions) in L.
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We will use ‘=’ to denote both set-theoretic identity as well as syntactic
equivalence.
Definition 1 (Syntax of L). L is the smallest set meeting the following
criteria:
(i) If A ∈ Ld, then A ∈ L.
(ii) If A1, . . . , An(n > 1) ∈ Ld and A1, . . . , An are pairwise syntacti-
cally distinct, i.e., non-equiform, then ?{A1, . . . , An} ∈ L.
(iii) Nothing else is a member of L.
In their most general form, evocation and e-implication are expli-
cated in terms of two entailment relations, one for single-conclusions
and another for multiple conclusions. But since we will be working in
the restricted context of CPL, we only need to use the standard, single-
conclusion entailment relation for classical logic, denoted by ‘.’ The
reader is welcome to supply this relation with her preferred semantics
for CPL.
Definition 2 (Evocation). If set of d-wffs, X evokes a question, Q, we
write X  Q.
X  Q iff
{
(i) X  ∨ dQ but
(ii) ∀A ∈ dQ(X 2 A)
The first condition for erotetic evocation requires that an evoked
question, Q has a true direct answer if the evoking set consists of truths.
A question is said to be sound iff at least one direct answer to the ques-
tion is true. So the first clause of Definition 2 amounts to transmission
of truth to soundness.
The second condition says that no single direct answer to Q is en-
tailed by X. This constraint encodes the concept of erotetic defeat—i.e.
when an agent’s information state (already) entails a direct answer to
a question, it is not entitled to inquire into it. Since it is possible for
X  Q to hold while for some X ′ ⊃ X, X ′ 6 Q, the evocation relation
is not monotonic.
IEL describes a variety of e-implication relations, but for our pur-
poses, we want to focus on one that is both transitive—so that we may
have a rule of cut in our system—and defeasible. In the language of IEL,
such a relation is strong, in the sense of being defeasible, and regular in
the sense that each answer to the implied question entails an answer to
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the implying one, rather than merely entailing a proper subset of answers
as general e-implication does.
Definition 3 (Strong Regular Erotetic Implication). If a question Q
strongly regularly implies a question Q′ on the basis of a set of d-wffs
X, we write X | Q Q′.
X | Q Q′ iff

(i) ∀A ∈ dQ (X ∪ {A}  ∨ dQ′) and
(ii) ∀B ∈ dQ′ ∃A ∈ dQ (X ∪ {B}  A) but
(iii) ∀A ∈ dQ (X 2 A)
The first clause in Definition 3 says that the implying question, to-
gether with a set of auxiliary d-wffs, X, entails that at least one direct
answers to the implied question is true. This ensures that the relation
transmits the soundness of Q and the truth of X to the soundness of
Q′. The second clause guarantees that Q′ is cognitively useful relative to
X and Q, in the sense that each direct answer to the implied question,
together with the auxiliary d-wffs, provides an answer to the initial,
implying question. (For the general relation of e-implication, cognitive
utility need only consist in narrowing down the set of direct answers to
the implying question). This condition aims to redeem the intuition that
pursuing an implied question is an epistemically rational way of inquiring
into the implying question—i.e. that drawing inferences in conformity
with e-implication is a rational way of making progress in inquiry. The
third clause in Definition 3 “strengthens” regular e-implication into a
nonmonontonic relation by encoding the conditions of erotetic defeat. It
tells us that the erotetic inference is defeated when an agent is (already)
entitled to believe an answer to its implying question.
The statements of defeasibility in these definitions are quite similar.
We may consider both evocation and strong regular e-implication (here-
after: esr-implication) as specifying conditions under which an agent
is entitled to inquire into a question that forms the conclusion of an
inference. Definition 2(ii) tells us that this entitlement is lost if an agent
has or acquires information that licenses a belief in one of its answers.
In other words, agents should not inquire into questions for which they
have the answer. Definition 3(iii) states that this entitlement is lost if an
agent has or acquires information that licenses it to believe the initial,
implying question’s answer. The entitlement to inquire into the implied
question, Q′, is, after all, based on its entitlement to inquire into the
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initial question, Q—i.e. inquiry into Q′ is a kind of rational strategy
for pursing inquiry into Q. Thus, if an agent has the answer to Q there
ceases to be a reason, ceteris paribus, to inquire into Q′. But if condition
(ii) in Definition 3 holds, then esr-implication will be similarly defeated
when an agent has an answer to the implied question, Q′, since if X  B
for some B ∈ dQ′ and if ∀B ∈ dQ′, X ∪ {B}  A for some A ∈ dQ,
then X  A, thus violating (iii). Evocation and esr-implication are both
therefore defeated when the declarative premises entail answers to their
question-conclusions.
Some other features of IEL’s representation of erotetic defeat are
worth considering. Both inferences are defeated, for instance, when their
declarative premises are inconsistent. If X , then X 6 Q and X |
Q 6 Q′, since X  A for any A ∈ dQ. This result obtains because of
CPL’s respect for the principle of explosion or ex contradictione quod
libet. Philosophers, logicians, and AI researchers have long criticized
the principle of explosion as unrepresentative of ordinary reasoning and
have promoted paraconsistent systems in which it does not hold. But
the behavior of evocation and esr-implication here appears to capture
an important kind of incoherence that characterizes agents trying to
conduct inquiry in the midst of inconsistent information. The calculus we
present below respects this fact and treats an inference with inconsistent
premises, i.e. any sequent with an inconsistent antecedent, as defeated.
Thus, technically speaking, the system is paraconsistent insofar as there
is no provable sequent corresponding to the principle of ex contradictione
quod libet.
Both evocations and e-implications are also defeated when one of
their questions has tautologous direct answers, i.e. if some A ∈ dQ is
valid in CPL. If there is some A ∈ dQ such that  A, then X 6 Q
and X | Q 6 Q′, since X  A. Concerns about this behavior may
be raised on the grounds that it encodes an unrealistic assumption of
logical omniscience. Even highly rational agents often fail to recognize
the logical consequences of their beliefs, let alone tautologies. So, it
seems equally unrealistic to model agents as infallible detectors of logical
truths. But the defeat of these inferences in cases where their question
have tautological answers aligns with the intuition that questions with
such non-factual answers are often redundant, pointless, or otherwise
fail to facilitate rational inquiry, at least that which deals with empirical
subject matter. Again, exploring alternative formulations of these infer-
ential relations that do not behave in this manner may be worthwhile.
A Defeasible Calculus for Zetetic Agents 11
3. The Calculus SC?
Now that we’ve seen the kinds of defeasible relations that IEL has to
offer, the challenge is to devise a proof theory capable of encoding these
relations as inference rules. Since we want our calculus to incorporate
defeasible inferences involving both declarative and erotetic formulas,
and since each rule will either introduce or eliminate a connective, we will
have distinct rules for propositional and erotetic connectives, with the
latter confined to interrogative-forming expressions of the form “?{. . .}”.
We begin by formulating the calculus for d-wffs, SCS and proceed by
extending it with rules for e-wffs.
3.1. The propositional sequent calculus SCS
Our calculus for defeasible propositional inferences, SCS, uses standard
multiple-succedent sequents composed of sets of formulas, e.g., Γ ` ∆.
Formulas on the left side of the turnstile are called the antecedent; on
the right side they are called the succedent. Commas in the antecedent
are read conjunctively and those in the succedent are read disjunctively.
The formula with the connective in a rule is the principal formula of that
rule, and its components in the premises are the active formulas. The
remaining elements of sequents are referred to as side formulas. But
unlike standard sequents, ours include a set of sets of d-wffs, called a
defeater set, just below our turnstile, e.g. Γ S ∆.4
We interpret sequents as representing a relationship that preserves
an agent’s epistemic entitlement to adopt doxastic and interrogative at-
titudes. We use the terms ‘entitled,’ ‘licensed,’ ‘rational,’ and ‘permis-
sible’ interchangeably to denote this preserved status. Thus, a provable
sequent says that any agent entitled to believe the statements and to in-
quire into the questions in the antecedent is entitled to believe or inquire
into at least one of the statements/questions in the succedent. While
sequents represent rules of entitlement-preserving inference, the rules of
our calculus are meta-rules of inference—i.e., they tell us what rules of
inference are legitimate given the axioms.
Defeater sets represent situations in which one is not permitted to
draw the inference represented by the sequent. A purely declarative
sequent such as A {C1,C2},{C3} B says that an agent who is entitled to
4The syntax of SCS sequents is inspired by the calculus in Piazza and Pulcini (2017).
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believe that A is entitled to believe that B unless it is entitled to believe
C1 or C2 or to believe that C3.
As this interpretation suggests, a sequent is defeated when an agent
is licensed to believe at least one statement in a member (set) of the
defeater set. (As we explain in Section 3.2, treating defeater sets as sets
of sets permits us to represent the peculiar conditions of erotetic defeat.)
D-wffs in the antecedent of a sequent specify which statements an agent
is entitled to believe. Roughly put, a sequent is defeated when some
statement in a member (set) of the defeater set is the (classical) logical
consequence of its antecedent. This amounts to assuming that an agent’s
belief set is closed under (classical) logical consequence.
SCS is inspired by Smullyan’s (1968) “symmetric” sequent calculus
for CPL, S , though it departs from that calculus in certain respects,
canvassed below. The core characteristic ofS that is carried over to SCS
is that the calculus does not allow for switching formulas from one side of
a sequent to another. Consequently, an end-sequent’s subformulas occur
on the same side of the turnstile throughout a derivation. As we shall
see, this constraint is important for preserving the intuitive meaning
of defeasible sequents. The rules for SCS are given in Figure 1. Note
that sets of side formulas that appear in these rules are represented by
Γ and ∆ which we defined as ranging over members of P(L). Strictly
speaking, however, SCS is defined over Ld. We use the metavariables
Γ,∆ to obviate re-writing the rules when we extend the calculus for L.
Like Smullyan’s S , our calculus, SCS, replaces the familiar negation
rules of LK with rules for double negation and De Morgan’s Laws, as
well as two additional axioms. But in contrast with S , SCS includes
structural rules, multiplicative rather than additive versions of the rules
for connectives, and axioms (four rather than three as in S ) that do not
permit arbitrary side-formulas. Proofs in the calculus are the familiar
tree structures of sequent calculi, but since sequents may be defeated, we
distinguish between derivations (i.e. trees constructed via the application
of rules irrespective of whether the sequents are defeated) and proofs (i.e.
trees in which no defeated sequents occur).
Definition 4 (Derivation, Proof, Paraproof). If a defeasible sequent,
Γ S ∆, occurs at the root of a finitely branching tree, pi, whose nodes
are defeasible sequents recursively built up from axioms by means of the
rules of SCS (SC?), then pi is said to be a derivation of Γ S ∆. If,
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additionally, each sequent in pi is undefeated, then pi is said to be a proof
of Γ S ∆ in SC
S (SC?), otherwise pi is called a paraproof of Γ S ∆.
So defeat and defeasibility play no role in determining which sequents
are derivable in SCS. Indeed, if we restrict our attention to derivable
sequents in SCS, we have a calculus that is but a variation of Smullyan’s
S—differing in the aspects noted above.
Lemma 1. X S Υ is derivable in SC
S iff X ` Υ is provable in S .
Smullyan’s S is sound and complete for CPL. So, it follows from
Lemma 1 that the antecedent of any sequent derivable in SCS classically
entails the disjunction of the elements in the succedent.
Lemma 2. X S Υ is derivable in SC
S iff X  ∨Υ .
Derivations in the system therefore constitute a calculus that is sound
and complete for CPL. The upshot of the distinction between derivations
and proofs in SCS is that we are able to mobilize the classical consequent
relation without having to appeal to an “external” calculus. This, in
turn, permits us to define the conditions of defeat internally, making
SCS, in a sense, self-contained.
Definition 5 (Defeat in SCS). A sequent is defeated just in case there
is sequent derivable in SCS that has the same antecedent and a succedent
that is a member of the original sequent’s defeater set. (The content of
the defeater set of this derivable sequent, i.e. T, is irrelevant.)
X S Υ is defeated iff ∃Z ∈ S such that X T Z is derivable in SCS.
The definition of defeat is designed to redeem certain intuitions about
defeasible inferences. For instance, if A defeats an inference, then an
agent entitled to A∧B ought not to make it (Example 1). Conversely, if
A ∧B defeats an inference but neither A nor B does by itself, then the
agent entitled to only one of the conjuncts may still draw the inference
(Example 2). Similarly, if A∨B defeats an inference, then the inference
is defeated if the agent is entitled to either of the disjuncts (Example
3). Finally, if A defeats an inference, then entitlement to A ∨ B need
not force an agent to reject it, since entitlement to B would preserve the
propriety of the inference (Example 4).
Example 1. p ∧ q {{p}} ∆ is defeated.
Example 2. p {{p∧q}} ∆ is undefeated.
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Example 3. p {{p∨q}} ∆ is defeated.
Example 4. p ∨ q {{p}} ∆ is undefeated.
Notice that when a sequent has an empty defeater set, i.e. Γ ∅
∆, the defeat mechanism in SCS is idle. Typically, defeasible logics
contain defeasible or “non-strict” rules and indefeasible or “strict” rules.
In SCS strict inference rules are represented by these sequents with empty
defeater sets, while defeasible inferences are captured by sequents with
nonempty defeater sets. (Since axioms may have empty or nonempty
defeater sets, the calculus permits a mix of strict and non-strict rules.)
With the notion of defeat in hand, we can now observe the advantage
accrued by using “symmetric” sequent rules—namely, to remain faithful
to the informal reading of sequents as ordinary defeasible inferences and,
in keeping with that goal, to ensure that unary (i.e. one-premise) rules
preserve defeat downward and undefeatedness upward.
Fact 1 (Unary Rules Preserve Defeat Downward). If Γ S ∆ follows
from Γ′ S′ ∆
′ via a unary rule (i.e. LW,RW,DE,∧`,`∨,¬¬`,`¬¬,
`¬∧,¬∨`), then Γ S ∆ is defeated if Γ′ S′ ∆′ is defeated. Contraposi-
tively, if Γ S ∆ is undefeated, then Γ′ S′ ∆
′ is undefeated.
The right rule for negation in LK, on the other hand, frustrates both
desiderata.
Γ, A S ∆ ` ¬
Γ S ¬A,∆
If, e.g., A ∈ ⋃S, then the upper sequent is defeated while the lower se-
quent is not. It is rather counter-intuitive to think that applying a purely
logical, unary rule of meta-inference should have this effect. Moreover,
it is quite difficult to give an intuitively plausible reading of this rule as
it appears to warrant an agent’s abandoning entitlement to a belief, i.e.
that A.
The binary rules `∧ and `¬∨ also preserve defeat downwards and
undefeatedness upwards. They share this property in virtue of their
multiplicative formulation. Since the antecedents of premises-sequents
in this rule are combined in the conclusion, any defeat that occurs in the
premises is carried downward.
Fact 2 (`∧ and `¬∨ Preserve Defeat Downward). If Γ S ∆ follows
from Γ′ S′ ∆
′ and Γ′′ S′′ ∆
′′ via `∧ or `¬∨, then Γ S ∆ is defeated if
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either Γ′ S′ ∆
′ or Γ′′ S′′ ∆
′′ is defeated. Contrapositively, if Γ S ∆ is
undefeated, then Γ′ S′ ∆
′ and Γ′′ S′′ ∆
′′ are undefeated.
In contrast, the binary rules ∨` and ¬∧` permit the derivation of
undefeated sequents from defeated ones. This fact, which figures promi-
nently in the proof of Lemma 3 below, arises because the rules’ active for-
mulas are logically stronger than their principal formula. Consequently,
a member of the conclusion’s defeater set may follow (classically) from
either of the premises’ antecedents while not following from the conclu-
sion’s.
Fact 3 (Derivation of Undefeated Sequents from Defeated Ones). Unde-
feated sequents can only be derived from (one or more) defeated sequents
via ∨` and ¬∧`.
The inclusion in SCS of a rule for left weakening may surprise the
reader, as this rule is typically associated with monotonicity. When a
sequent’s antecedent is weakened by a formula that entails a member of
the defeater set, however, the result is a defeated sequent. As Definition
4 makes clear, proofs in the calculus must not contain defeated sequents.
Thus, provability in the calculus will indeed conform to nonmonotonicity.
A rule for expanding the defeater set, DE, is also provided in order to
represent cases of reasoning in which new information about defeaters is
acquired.
While undefeated sequents can only be obtained from defeated ones
via ∨` or ¬∧`, defeated sequents may be derived from undefeated ones
by any rule that expands the antecedent or defeater set of the conclusion.
These include not only LW,DE but also the multiplicative binary rules
∨`,`∧,¬∧`,`¬∨.
Fact 4 (Derivation of Defeated Sequents). Defeated sequents can only
be derived from (one or more) undefeated sequents via LW,DE,∨`,`∧,
¬∧`,`¬∨.
The engine of defeat in the calculus are the axioms and their respec-
tive defeater sets. The rules ax1, ax2 and ax3 provide sequents with
equivalent, possibly empty defeater sets. The members of these sets
encode (extra-logical) conditions under which an agent is not entitled to
believe that the atom is true. We restrict these sets to literal formulas
and insist that they not include the atom that they introduce or its
negation, i.e. p,¬p 6∈ ⋃S. This constraint ensures that the axioms will
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not introduce defeated sequents. Moreover, permitting the negations of
atoms in the defeater sets would be redundant; inconsistent antecedents
uniformly yield defeated sequents, since A,¬A `SC X for any setX ∈ Ld.
Among other things, this means that there is no provable defeasible se-
quent in SCS corresponding the law of ex contradictione quod libet and
to this extent, the calculus behaves paraconsistently.
However, initial sequents of the form p,¬p ` derived by the rule ax4
are exempted from this behavior and their defeater sets are empty. The
reasons for this are both conceptual and technical. The technical reason
is that, as just noted, any sequent with an inconsistent antecedent and
nonempty defeater set is automatically defeated. The conceptual reason
is that defeaters follow the conclusions of inferences, in the sense that
they tell agents when they are not authorized to infer beliefs. So it is only
when formulas occur on the right-hand side of the turnstile that defeaters
specific to those formulas are relevant. The calculus’ “symmetric” logical
rules ensure that these defeaters travel with their respective formulas, so
to speak, throughout a derivation.
Definition 6 (Axiom Defeater Sets). For any atom p, we assign a set
of (sets of) defeaters, denoted Sp, such that ⋃Sp ⊂ (A ∪ {¬q | q ∈
A})\{p,¬p}.
Given the “symmetric” structure of SCS, this constraint guarantees
that the end-sequent of any RW-free derivation will contain, in its de-
feater set, the defeaters of every atom that occurs in the succedent.
Fact 5. If Γ S ∆ is the end-sequent of a RW-free derivation in SC
S,
then Sp ⊂ S for all p ∈ A(∆), where A(∆) denotes the set of atoms that
occur in any member of ∆.
We close this section by establishing the soundness and completeness
of the propositional calculus SCS.
Definition 7 (Compatibility, % for SCS). When a set of d-wffs, X, and
a set of sets of d-wffs, S, fail to meet the conditions of defeat, they are
said to be compatible. We use the symbol ‘%’ to denote this relationship,
which we define formally as follows:
X % S iff there is no Υ ∈ S such that Γ T Υ is derivable in SCS.
We omit set notation on the left-hand side when there is no threat of
misunderstanding, writing X,A % S ∪T for X ∪ {A} % S ∪ T. When
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this relation fails to hold, we say that X and S are incompatible and
express this by writing: X 6% S.
Although derivable sequents correspond to classical entailments, not
all derivations are proofs. Thus, to establish the completeness of the
calculus, we must show that every derivable undefeated sequent has a
proof.
Lemma 3 (Derivable undefeated sequents are provable). If X S Υ is
undefeated (i.e. X % S) and derivable in SCS, then there is a proof of
X S Υ in SC
S.
Proof. We proceed by induction on proof-height. For the base case,
X S Υ is obtained by an application of an axiom, and since it is unde-
feated (in fact following the constraints imposed on axiom defeater sets,
it must be undefeated), the result is a proof. For induction, assume that
any undefeated sequent whose derivation height is ≤ h has a proof and
that X S Υ has a derivation height of h+1. The proof for the inductive
case utilizes the following technique. Take the derivation of X S Υ and
for every sequent that occurs in the proof, replace its defeater set with
the empty set. Next, remove every instance of the DE-rule—these are
now redundant given that all sequents have empty defeater sets. Finally
apply DE to the end-sequent as needed to obtain its original defeater
set. By hypothesis, the end-sequent is undefeated and all other sequents
in the derivation are undefeated either because they are the result of
applying DE to obtain the original end-sequent or because their defeater
sets are empty. The derivation thus obtained is a proof.




r {{p}} r `∧
p, r {{t},{p}} p ∧ r
ax.
q {{s}} q DE
q {{s},{q}} q ∨`
p ∨ q, r {{t},{p},{s},{q}} p ∧ r, q
Since p, r S p is derivable in SC
S we know that p, r 6% {{p}, {s}} and that
p, r {{p},{s}} p ∧ r is thus defeated. Similarly, q {{s},{q}} q is defeated.





r ∅ r `∧
p, r ∅ p ∧ r
ax.
q ∅ q ∨`
p ∨ q, r ∅ p ∧ r, q DE
p ∨ q, r {{t} p ∧ r, q...
DE
p ∨ q, r {{t},{p},{s},{q}} p ∧ r, q

Lemma 4 (Soundness and Completeness of SCS). X S Υ is provable in
SCS iff X  ∨Υ and X 2 ∨(⋃S).
Proof. (⇒) By Lemma 2 and Definition 7, it follows that X 2 ∨(⋃S)
iff X % S. Since, according to Definition 4, every provable sequent is
derivable and undefeated (i.e. X % S), we obtain the desired result via
Lemmas 2 and 3.
(⇐) From Lemmas 2 and 3. 
3.2. Erotetic Defeat in SC?
We now extend SCS to SC?, whose rules are presented in Figure 2. The
axioms for this extension remain unchanged, as do the logical rules that
apply to d-wffs, now explicitly restricted to the latter. The rule for
defeater set expansion, DE is also preserved, but LW and RW are gen-
eralized to apply to any formula in L, as ranged over by the variables
F,G,H. Finally, SC? contains four rules that yield e-wffs in sequents.
We discuss each in detail below, but first we define defeat in SC?.
We extend the notion of defeat conservatively to ensure that sequents
which are defeated in SCS remain defeated in SC?. To that end, we
introduce the function, E(·), which maps subsets of L to subsets of Ld.
This function allows us to define defeat in SC? in terms of defeat in SCS.
Definition 8 (E(·)). Recall that d-wffs are ranged over by the variables
A,B,C (with subscripts). Let E(Γ) denote the set that results from
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removing all e-wffs from Γ and replacing them with a disjunction of
their declarative constituents, i.e.
E(Γ) = {A : A ∈ Γ} ∪ {A1∨...∨An : ?{A1, . . . , An} ∈ Γ}
We say that E(Γ) declarativizes Γ.
Definition 9 (Defeat in SC?). A sequent in SC? is defeated just in case
a sequent with the declarativized antecedent and a succedent composed
of at least one member of the defeater set is derivable in SCS.
Γ S ∆ is defeated iff ∃X ∈ S such that E(Γ) T X is derivable in SCS.
We are now able to see how erotetic defeat is represented in our
calculus and to explain why defeater sets are drawn from subsets of
P(P(Ld)). Recall that, in general, an erotetic inference is defeated when
an agent is licensed to believe a direct answer to the relevant question—
i.e. the question to which the agent would otherwise be licensed to
inquire into. In order to capture this phenomenon, we must represent
situations in which an agent is entitled to inquire into a question on the
grounds of her entitlement to believe that at least one of its answers is
true but in which, if the agent were to gain entitlement to a particular
answer, she would lose her license to inquire into it. Erotetic inferences
are permissible when an agent knows that at least one answer to its
question is true without knowing which one, but are not permissible
when the agent knows a particular answer. Representing information
about defeaters as sets of sets allows us to capture these situations.
Consider the following:
Example 5. p ∨ ¬p {{p}{¬p}} ?{p,¬p}
If the sequent in Example 5 is provable, then the agent’s entitlement
to p ∨ ¬p licenses it to inquire into the question ?{p,¬p}, since it is
entitled to believe that at least one of its answers is true. But were the
agent to obtain information that licensed the belief that p or that ¬p—
represented by adding either d-wff to the antecedent—it would forfeit
that entitlement. Placing each direct answer to the succedent-question
as a singleton in the defeater set has the effect of maintaining entitle-
ment to believe that at least one answer to a question is true while
barring such entitlement when a particular direct answer is obtained.
As we shall demonstrate, Example 5 is interpretable as an inference rule
underwritten by the evocation relation.
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Sequent-analogs to esr-implication are also available. The sequent in
Example 6 would be defeated were either q or r (i.e. the direct answers
to the implying question) added to its antecedent.
Example 6. ¬p ∨ q, p ∨ r, ?{q, r} {{q}{r}} ?{p,¬p}
3.3. Rules for E-wffs in SC?
Let us now turn to the e-wff rules in the calculus. As set-theoretic
notation often becomes cumbersome, we avail ourselves of the following
abbreviations.
Definition 10 (Abbreviations).
• ?[A|n] abbreviates ?{A1, . . . , An}.
• [A|n] abbreviates {A1, . . . , An}.
• Γ|n and S|n abbreviate Γ1∪ . . .∪Γn and S1∪ . . .∪Sn, respectively.
• [A|n] abbreviates {{A1}, . . . , {An}}.
SC? provides right and left rules for e-wffs (i.e., `?1,`?2, ?`1, and
?`2). Since right and left rules for connectives in a sequent calculus
correspond, respectively, to the introduction and elimination rules in
natural deduction, we will say that the rules `?1 and `?2 govern the in-
troduction of e-wffs and that ?`1 and ?`2 govern their elimination. Two
pairs of introduction and elimination rules are needed to capture the
distinction between evocation and e-implication. Both inference types
have questions as their conclusions, but while the premises of the latter
also include a question, those of the former do not. To represent evoca-
tion, we need a rule that permits the introduction (resp. elimination) of
e-wffs in sequents whose antecedents (resp. succedents) consist solely of
d-wffs, while representing implication requires a rule that permits such
introduction (resp. elimination) in cases when the antecedents (resp.
succedents) also contain e-wffs. It is natural to think that beliefs alone
license inquiry in a manner that differs from the way beliefs plus prior in-
quisitive commitments, represented by questions, license further inquiry.
Formulating two versions of each introduction and elimination rule is an
elegant way to respect this difference.
Let’s examine `?1.
X S A1, . . . , An,∆ `?1
X S∪{{A1},...,{An}} ?{A1, . . . , An},∆
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Ignoring side formulas, we read the rule as saying that an agent entitled
to believe that some statement in the set {A1,..., An} is true is thereby
entitled to inquire into the question ?{A1,..., An}, so long as she is not
entitled to believe any particular member of that set, i.e. any direct
answer to the question.
While this rule is intended to capture evocation, it actually represents
a more general relationship, since the succedents of the premise and
conclusion may include a set of side formulas composed of d-wffs or e-
wffs. The generality of the rule is motivated by the desire to formulate
rules for e-wffs that conform to the standard format of multiple-succedent
calculi, such as SC.
When there are no side formulas, the rule `?1 faithfully depicts evo-
cation, as demonstrated by Theorem 1 below. The first condition in
Definition 2 is satisfied by the fact that the succedent of the premise,
i.e.{A1,..., An}, contains all of the direct answers to the question in the
succedent of the conclusion, i.e., ?{A1,..., An}. Satisfying the second
condition of erotetic evocation, i.e. the one concerning its defeasibility,
requires significant exploitation of the defeater set mechanism. Recall
that this condition prohibits evocation whenever the set of d-wffs entails
a direct answer to the evoked question. By including singletons of each
direct answer in the defeater set of the conclusion, `?1 guarantees that
the set of auxiliary d-wffs does not entail a direct answer to the evoked
question. Since defeat is defined as a relation between the d-wffs in the
antecedent set on one hand, and members of the defeater set on the
other, the inclusion of direct answers as separate sets permits X to fulfill
the second condition without jeopardizing its satisfaction of the first.
Let us now consider the left-rule for e-wffs, ?`1.
Γ1, A1 S1 X1 . . .Γn, An Sn Xn ?`1
Γ|n, ?{A1, . . . , An} S|n ∪{{A1},...,{An}} X|n
Again ignoring side formulas, the rule says that an agent entitled to
believe at least one member of a set of statements, X, on the basis of its
entitlement to believe A1 or . . . or An is also entitled to X on the basis
of its entitlement to inquire into the question ?{A1,..., An}, so long as
it is not licensed to believe one of its answers.
The observant reader will no doubt have noticed that `?1 and ?`1
are essentially expanded versions of the classical elimination rules for
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∨ in SCS. This overlap is to be expected, since questions in IEL for
classical logic presuppose that at least one of their possible answers is
true. However, the addition of formulas to the conclusion’s defeater set
shows that `?1 (resp. ?`1) is not equivalent to ` ∨ (resp. ∨ `).
We now turn to the second introduction rule for e-wffs, i.e., `?2.
Γ1, ?[A|n] S [B|m],∆1 Γ2, B1 T1 Ai,∆2 . . .Γm+1, Bm Tm Aj ,∆m+1 `?2
Γ|m+1, ?[A|n] S∪T|m∪{{A1},...,{An}} ?[B|m],∆|m+1
This rule may be read top-down, omitting side formulas, as fol-
lows: anyone entitled to believe that B1 or . . . or Bm on the basis of
its entitlement to inquire into ?{A1,..., An} and whose entitlement to
believe any member of {B1,..., Bn} licenses an answer to that question
(i.e. {Ai,..., Aj} ⊆ {A1,..., An}), is thereby entitled to inquire into
?{B1,..., Bn}, so long as she is not licensed to believe one of its answers.
The rule is intended to capture the relation of esr-implication. The
left-most premise roughly corresponds to the first clause in Definition 3,
according to which an answer to the implying question, together with the
set of d-wffs, entails that there is a true answer to the implied question.
The premises to the right roughly correspond to the second condition,
according to which, an answer to the implied question, together with the
set of d-wffs, entails an answer to the implying question. The presence
of the direct answers to ?{A1,..., An} as singletons in the conclusion’s
defeater set attempts to capture esr-implication as stated in Definition
3’s third clause. We note that the d-wffs that appear in the succedent
of the second set of premise, i.e. Ai,..., Aj , may include any of those
that occur in {A1,..., An}. They need not exhaust the latter and it is
perfectly acceptable that i = j. This applies to the proviso on ?`2 as
well.
Admittedly, `?2 encodes less restrictive conditions than those im-
posed by esr-implication insofar as it permits side formulas of either the
declarative or erotetic sort. Again, this liberalization brings the rule into
conformity with standard rules in classical sequent calculi.
Finally, we turn to ?`2 (see Figure 2). We read the rule top-down,
omitting side formulas, as follows: an agent who is entitled to inquire
into ?{B1,..., Bm} on the basis of entitlement to believe any statement
from the set {A1,..., An} and who is entitled to believe some statement
in the latter on the basis of her entitlement to believe any statement in
{B1,..., Bm}, is thereby licensed to inquire into ?{B1,..., Bm} if she is
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entitled to inquire into ?{A1,..., An}, so long as she is not licensed to
believe one of its answers. Recall that the motivation behind `?1 and
`?2 is that in order to represent evocation and esr-implication, a calculus
needs to distinguish between inferences in which a question follows from
a set of statements and those in which a question follows from at least
one question. Symmetry demands that we respect this difference in our
elimination rules as well.
4. Main Results
We move now to proving that certain classes of sequents in SC? are sound
and complete with respect to evocation and esr-implication. We begin
with some helpful Lemmas.
Definition 11 (Compatibility, %, in SC?). When a set of formulas,
Γ, and a set of sets of d-wffs, S, fail to meet the conditions of defeat,
they are said to be compatible. We use the symbol ‘%’ to denote this
relationship, which we define formally as follows:
Γ % S iff there is no X ∈ S such that E(Γ) T X is derivable in SCS.
Again, we use the comma for set union when there is no threat of mis-
understanding.
Definition 12 (Provability of sequents in SC?). We write Γ S
SC? ∆ to
denote the fact that there is a proof of Γ S ∆ in SC
?.
Lemma 5 (Height-Preserving Invertibility of ∨`). If Γ, A1∨...∨An S ∆
has a proof height ≤ h, then Γ′, Ai S′ ∆′ for all i ∈ {1,..., n} and some
Γ′ ⊆ Γ,∆′ ⊆ ∆,S′ ⊆ S have proofs of height ≤ h.
Proof. By induction on proof height. For the base case,
Γ, A1∨...∨An S ∆ cannot be obtained directly from an axiom. For
induction, assume that height-preserving inversion holds up to height h
and that Γ, A1∨...∨An S ∆ has a proof of height h+ 1. From Definition
4, it follows by this hypothesis that the premises employed to derive
Γ, A1∨...∨An S ∆ are undefeated, and thus we need only show that
there is a height-preserving derivation. There are two cases:
Case 1: A1∨...∨An is principal in the last rule. It must be obtained via
LW or ∨`. Assume the latter. So, Γ1, A1 S1 ∆1 and Γn, A2∨...∨An Sn
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∆n, where S|n = S; Γ|n = Γ; and ∆|n = ∆, have derivations ≤ h. The
first of these sequents satisfies the claim’s consequent, while the second
is covered by our inductive hypothesis. If A1∨...∨An is obtained by LW,
then Γ S ∆ has a derivation of height ≤ h. We apply LW to obtain
the sequents Γ, Ai S ∆ for all i ∈ {1,..., n} with proof heights ≤ h+ 1.
Case 2: A1∨...∨An is not principal in the last rule. Then it has no more
than two premises Γ′′, A1∨...∨An S′′ ∆′′ and Γ′′′, A1∨...∨An S′′′ ∆′′′
with proof heights ≤ h, so by inductive hypothesis Γ′′, Ai S′′ ∆′′ and
Γ′′′, Ai S′′′ ∆
′′′ for all i ∈ {1,..., n} have proofs of height ≤ h. 
Lemma 6 (Height-Preserving Invertibility of `∨). If Γ S A1∨...∨An,∆
has a proof height ≤ h, then Γ S A1,..., An,∆ has a proof of height
≤ h.
Proof. Ay induction on proof height. Assume height-preserving in-
version up to h and let Γ S A1∨...∨An,∆ have a proof height h + 1.
Again, it follows by this hypothesis that the premises used to derive
this sequent are undefeated. If A1 ∨ ...∨ An is the principal formula
in the last rule, then Γ S A1,..., An,∆ has a proof of ≤ h. If
A1 ∨ ...∨ An is not principal in the last rule, then the conclusion fol-
lows from no more than two premises Γ′′ S′′ A1 ∨ ... ∨ An,∆′′ and
Γ′′′ S′′′ A1 ∨...∨An,∆′′′ with proof heights ≤ h. Ay inductive hypothe-
sis, it follows that Γ′′ S′′ A1,..., An,∆
′′ and Γ′′′ S′′′ A1,..., An,∆
′′′ have
proofs of height ≤ h. Apply the last rule to obtain Γ S A1,..., An,∆
with a proof of height ≤ h+ 1. 
Lemma 7. Γ, ?[A|n] S
SC?
Υ iff Γ, A1∨...∨An SSC
?
Υ .
Proof. (⇒) By induction on proof height. For the base case,
Γ, ?[A|n] S Υ is not an axiom as it contains at least one e-wff. For
induction, assume our result holds for all proofs of height ≤ h and that
Γ, ?[A|n] S Υ has a proof of height h+ 1. There are two cases.
Case 1: If ?[A|n] is the principal formula, then it is obtained via LW
or ?`1, since the succedent is declarative. Assume it is obtained by the
latter. It follows that the premises of ?`1 are provable, i.e. Γ1, A1 T1
SC?
Υ1 . . .Γn, An Tn
SC?
Υn, where Γ|n = Γ; Υ|n = Υ and T|n∪ [A|n] = S. Since
none of these premises is defeated, there is no i ∈ {1,..., n} such that
Ai ∈ ⋃Ti. Successive applications of ∨` and appropriate applications
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of DE to these sequents (e.g. to add [A|n] to the defeater set if it is
not already included) yield Γ, A1∨...∨An S Υ . Since, by hypothesis,
Γ, ?[A|n] S Υ is undefeated and since it follows from Definition 8 that
E(Γ∪ ?[A|n]) = E(Γ) ∪ A1∨...∨An, we know that Γ ∪ {A1∨...∨An} % S.
So, Γ, A1∨...∨An SSC
?
Υ . If ?[A|n] is introduced via LW, then Γ S
SC?
Υ .
We apply LW to obtain a proof of Γ, A1∨...∨An S Υ .
Case 2: If ?[A|n] is not principal in the last rule, then it follows from
no more than two premises Γ′, ?[A|n] S′ Υ
′ and Γ′′, ?[A|n] S′′ Υ
′′ with
proof heights ≤ h. So by inductive hypothesis, Γ′, A1∨...∨An S′
SC?
Υ ′
and Γ′′, A1∨...∨An S′′
SC?
Υ ′′. We apply the last rule to obtain a proof of
Γ, A1∨...∨An S Υ .
(⇐) Again, by induction on proof height. From Lemma 5, we know
that Γ′, Ai S′
SC?
Υ ′ for all i ∈ {1,..., n} and some Γ′ ⊆ Γ, Υ ′ ⊆ Υ,S′ ⊆ S
have proof heights ≤ h. We apply ?`1 to these sequents to obtain a
proof of Γ, ?[A|n] S Υ . 
Lemma 8. X S
SC? ?[B|m],∆ iff X S
SC?
B1∨...∨Bm,∆.
Proof. (⇒) By induction on proof height. In the base case, X S
?[B|m],∆ is not an axiom. For induction, we assume that the result
holds for all proofs of height ≤ h and that X S ?[B|m],∆ has a proof of
height h+ 1. Again there are two cases.
Case 1: If ?[B|m] is the principal formula, then it must be obtained via
RW or `?1, since the antecedent is declarative. If it follows via the latter,
the premise is provable, so X T
SC?
B1,..., Bm,∆ where T ∪ [B|m] = S.
We apply `∨, followed, if needed, by DE to add [B|m] to T, and thus
obtain a proof of X S
SC?
B1∨...∨Bm,∆. If ?[B|m] is introduced via RW,
then X S
SC? ∆. Apply RW to weaken the succedent by B1∨...∨Bm and
we have the desired proof.
Case 2: If ?[B|m] is the not principal in the last rule, then the conclusion
follows from no more than two premises X ′ S′ ?[B|m],∆
′ and X ′′ S′′
?[B|m],∆′′ with proof heights ≤ h. So by inductive hypothesis X ′ S′
SC?
B1∨...∨Bm,∆′ and X ′′ S′′
SC?





(⇐) Again, by induction on proof height. From Lemma 6, we know
that Γ S
SC?
B1, . . . , Bm,∆ has a proof of height ≤ h. We apply `?1 to
obtain the desired sequent. 
Lemma 9. X, ?[A|n] S
SC? ?[B|m], Υ iff
(i)X,A1∨...∨An SSC
?
B1∨...∨Bm, Υ ; and
(ii) for all j ∈ {1,...,m}, there exists k ∈ {1,..., n} and exists T ⊂ S
such that X,Bj T
SC?
Ak, Υ .
Proof. (⇒) By induction on proof height. There are two cases.
Case 1: Either ?[A|n] or ?[B|m] is principal in the last rule. There are
three sub-cases.
(1a.) Suppose that the last rule applied is ?`2 and ?[A|n] is principal.
So, there are proofs of the left-hand set of premises in ?`2, i.e. se-
quents of the form Xi, Ai Si ?[B|m], Υi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Iterative
applications of ∨` yield X ′, A1∨...∨An S′ ?[B|m], Υ ′ where X ′ ⊆ X,
Υ ′ ⊆ Υ and S′ ⊆ S. From the appropriate applications of LW,RW and
DE we obtain X,A1∨...∨An S ?[B|m], Υ . From Lemma 8, it follows that
X,A1∨...∨An SSC
?
B1∨...∨Bm, Υ , and condition (i) is satisfied. Similarly,
it follows that there are proofs of the right-hand set of premises in ?`2,
i.e. for all j ∈ {1,...,m}, there exists k ∈ {1,..., n}, X ′ ⊆ X,Υ ′ ⊆ Υ,
and Tj ⊂ S such that X ′, Bj Tj Ak, Υ ′. Note that since none of these
premises is defeated, Ak 6∈ ⋃Tj . As {Ak} ∈ [A|n] and [A|n] ⊆ S, the de-
feater sets of these sequents must be proper subsets of the end-sequent’s
defeater set, i.e. for all j ∈ {1,...,m}, Tj ⊂ S. By judicious applications
of LW,RW, and DE we arrive at proofs of the sequents X,Bj T Ak, Υ
for all j ∈ {1,...,m} and at least one k ∈ {1,..., n}, where T—for rea-
sons just mentioned—is some proper subset of S. Thus, condition (ii) is
satisfied.
(1b.) Suppose that the last rule applied is `?2 and ?[B|m] is princi-
pal. It follows that the left-hand sequent of that rule, X ′, ?[A|n] S′
B1,..., Bm, Υ
′ is provable, where X ′ ⊆ X, Υ ′ ⊆ Υ and S′ ⊆ S. We apply
`∨ to obtain X ′, ?[A|n] S′ B1∨...∨Bm, Υ ′ and from Lemma 7 we have
X ′, A1∨...∨An S′ B1∨...∨Bm, Υ ′. Apply LW,RW, and DE as needed to
obtain X,A1∨...∨An S B1∨...∨Bm, Υ , which satisfies condition (i). The
right-hand set of premises in `?2 ensure that condition (ii) is satisfied in
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the manner of the first sub-case.
(1c.) If ?[A|n] or ?[B|m] is principle and the last rule is weakening, then
the result follows by inductive hypothesis in the manner of Lemmas 7
and 8.
Case 2: Neither ?[A|n] nor ?[B|m] is principal in the last rule. So
X, ?[A|n] S ?[B|m], Υ follows from one or more premises covered by the
inductive hypothesis.
(⇐) By induction on proof height of sequents in conditions (i) and
(ii). Given condition (i), it follows from Lemma 6 thatX,A1∨...∨An SSC
?
B1,..., Bm,∆ and from Lemma 7 we obtain X, ?[A|n] S B1,..., Bm,∆.
Condition (ii) then gives us the premises needed to apply `?2, which
yields X, ?[A|n] S ?[B|m], Υ . 
Corollary 1. If Γ S
SC? ∆, then E(Γ) SSC
? E(∆).
Proof. Let E(·) be a function P(L) 7→ N that returns the number of
e-wffs in a set of formulas. We proceed by induction on the number
of e-wffs in the left-hand sequent, i.e. E(Γ ∪ ∆). For our base case,
E(Γ ∪∆) = 0. So Γ S ∆ contains no e-wffs and thus satisfies the right-
hand side of the biconditional. For induction, assume our result holds for
all sequents such that E(Γ∪∆) ≤ n. Now assume that Γ S ∆ is such that
E(Γ∪∆) = n+1. It follows from our inductive hypothesis that X SSC
?
Υ
where either X = E(Γ\{Q}) or Υ = E(∆\{Q}) for some e-wff Q ∈ Γ∪∆.
Thus we need only show that X ∪E({Q}) SSC
?
Υ and X S
SC?
Υ ∪E({Q})
and these follow from Lemmas 7 and 8, respectively. 
Corollary 2. SC? is a conservative extension of SCS, that is, any
sequent composed solely of d-wffs (i.e. formulas of Ld) that is provable
in SC?is provable in SCS and vice versa.
Corollary 1 tells us that the declarativized version of any provable
erotetic sequent (i.e. a sequent containing at least one e-wff) is also
provable. This is not particularly surprising given the tight relationship
between classical disjunctions and e-wffs. From the adequacy of the
declarative calculus SCS for CPL (i.e. Lemma 2), it follows that two
classes of defeasible sequents in SC? are sound and complete with respect
to evocation (Definition 2) and strong regular e-implication (Definition
3).
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Theorem 1. X ?[A|n] iff X S∪[A|n]
SC? ?[A|n] for some (possibly empty)
S.
Proof. (⇒) From Lemma 4, the first condition in Definition 2 implies
that X S
SC?
A1 ∨ ...∨ An for some (possibly empty) S and the second
condition implies that X % [A|n]. Apply DE to X S A1 ∨ ...∨ An to
obtain a proof of X S∪[A|n] A1 ∨ ...∨ An. The result then follows by
Lemma 8.
(⇐) From Lemma 8, it follows by hypothesis that X S∪[A|n]
SC?
A1∨...∨An.
Thus, X % [A|n]. By Definitions 9 and 11 and Lemma 4, it follows that
the two conditions on erotetic evocation (Definition 2) are satisfied. 
Theorem 2. X | ?[A|n]  ?[B|m] iff X, ?[A|n] S∪[A|n]
SC? ?[B|m] for some
(possibly empty) S.
Proof. (⇒) By Definition 3 and Lemma 4, it follows that (i)
X,A1∨...∨An S∪[A|n]
SC?
B1 ∨ ...∨Bm, (since the third condition in Defini-
tion 3 entails that X % [A|n]) and that (ii) for all j ∈ {1,...,m}, there
exists k ∈ {1,..., n} and exists T ⊂ S ∪ [A|n] such that X,Bj TSC
?
Ak.
The result is then obtained by Lemma 9.
(⇐) From Lemma 9, it follows that (i) X,A1∨...∨An S∪[A|n]
SC?
B1∨...∨Bm
and that (ii) for all j ∈ {1,...,m}, there exists k ∈ {1,..., n} and exists
T ⊂ S∪ [A|n] such that X,Bj TSC
?
Ak. From Definition 3 and Lemma 4
we know that the three conditions on esr-implication (Definition 3) are
satisfied. 
Theorem 3. SC? is decidable.
Proof. We restrict our attention to derivations in SC? in which no
sequent appears twice in a branch, following the usual reduction to con-
cise proofs. When confronted with an end-sequent Γ S ∆, we must first
determine whether it is defeated. If it is, then there is no proof. If it is
undefeated, then we proceed in the manner of the standard proof search
algorithm for sequent calculi, i.e. we consider all the possible inference
rules that could have Γ S ∆ as a conclusion and construct a number of
trees, one for each distinct possibility, writing down the premises of such
rules above it. Matters are slightly complicated by the presence of the
DE rule. However, since the defeater sets of any sequent are finite, we
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know that there is an upper bound to the number of derivations for any
end-sequent containing a nonempty defeater set. We then repeat this
process for the premises of each successive rule, at each point checking
to see whether the premises are defeated. If a premise is defeated in a
tree, then, following Definition 4, it is not a possible proof, and thus we
turn to the remaining trees. We proceed in this fashion until we have
trees with no defeated sequents whose leaves are axioms. 
In order to reduce the length of proofs—a desideratum for any im-
plementation of the system—we can add a cut rule to the calculus, i.e:
Γ S F,∆ Γ′, F T ∆′
cut
Γ′,Γ S∪T ∆,∆′
SC? is sound and complete for CPL and, as noted above, the relation
of esr-implication is transitive, so this rule is admissible when the cut
formula is either a d-wff or an e-wff.
5. Example
Assume that an agent, α is assigned the task of determining which of
the following formulas is true: p, q. Assume further, that α has learned
that ¬s ∨ p and s ∨ q but has yet to obtain an answer to its princi-
pal question. Additionally, α’s knowledge base includes the information
about defeaters. Writing ‘ ’ for ‘defeats,’ the information is as follows:
{r} s, {t} p and {u, v} q. Now, what question(s) should α ask?
There are various algorithms or heuristics the agent might operate with
that determine or suggest ways of using SC? to arrive at strategies for
answering principal questions via sub-questions. Formulating such rules
is an interesting exercise in its own right, but suppose that α is provided
with the following.
Erotetic Strategy: For a question, Q, and a set of facts, X, de-
termine whether you are licensed to inquire into ?A for any formula, A,
that occurs as a subformula in member of X but not in a member of dQ,
i.e. find a question, distinct from Q, that is ers-implied by Q ∪X.
Strategy Implementation in SC?: Try to prove X,Q S∪ [dQ] ?A
such that A ∈ Subform(X)\Subform(dQ).
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s ∨ q,¬s {{u,v}} q `?2
?{p, q},¬s ∨ p, s ∨ q {{r},{t},{u,v},{p},{q}} ?{s,¬s}
With the derivation of the end-sequent above, α now has an erotetic
inference that licenses it to inquire into ?s as a means of answering
?{p, q}. There are a few ways to conceive of α’s use of this inference.
Perhaps the simplest is that once its derivation is obtained, α transitions
from its inference mode to data-collection, and back again, adding each
new piece of information to the sequent’s antecedent via LW until the
sequent is defeated. Such defeat then represents the fact that either α’s
initial question has been answered (i.e. if the new antecedent implies
p, q, s, or ¬s) or that exceptions to the inference’s warrant have been
found (i.e. if the new antecedent implies {r}, {t}, or {u, v}).
6. Conclusion
The calculus SC? satisfies our desiderata of an informally adequate and
formally well-behaved calculus for defeasible erotetic inferences. The
calculus’ decidability makes it suitable for automated reasoning systems,
such as ATPs discussed in the introduction. We think the system lays the
ground for future investigations into the nature of erotetic defeasibility
and the implementation of zetetically rational agents.
There are several ways to augment or otherwise alter SC? that might
capture other types of erotetic inference or features of erotetic defeat.
For instance, the defeater set mechanism is rather coarse-grained insofar
as it assimilates information that undermines propositional inferences
with that which undermines erotetic inferences, i.e. answers. A simple
way to distinguish and track changes in these two data sets would be
to adorn the turnstile with two defeater sets, one that retains the sets
of initial sequents, and one that only encodes additions made via one of
the e-wff rules. Defeater sets would still be assembled in the binary rules
via set-union.
Another way in which SC? might be fruitfully developed would be to
extend it in a such a way as to capture the general relation of erotetic
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implication, where implied questions need only entail proper subsets of
answers to the implying question. To do so, we might let Θi,Θj stand for
nonempty proper subsets of [A|n], i.e., Θi,Θj ∈ P([A|n])/{∅, [A|n]}. By
replacing Ai, Aj in `?2 and ?`2 with Θi,Θj , we obtain a rule that yields
sequents that are sound and complete with respect to general erotetic
implication.
It would be quite interesting to see how SC? compares to IEL’s
erotetic search scenarios, which model the behavior of interrogators who
answer a principle question by seeking out more easily or economically
obtained answers to subordinate questions. Since strategies for resolv-
ing these scenarios are based on e-implicative relations, there are prov-
able sequents in SC? corresponding to each successful erotetic move.
As algorithms for generating these scenarios have already been imple-
mented (Bolotov, Łupkowski, & Urbański, 2006; Chlebowski, Komosin-
ski, & Kups, 2017; Leszczyńska-Jasion, Urbański, & Wiśniewski, 2013;
Łupkowski & Leszczyńska-Jasion, 2015), there is reason to think that
implementing SC? is both feasible and complementary of the systems
for erotetic search scenarios. This would be one of the many ways to
advance the study and design of zetetic agents.
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Γ S ∆ LW
Γ, A S ∆
Γ S ∆ RW
Γ S A,∆
Γ S ∆ DE
Γ S∪T ∆
Logical Rules
Γ, A,B S ∆ ∧`
Γ, A ∧B S ∆
Γ S A,∆ Γ′ T B,∆′ `∧
Γ′,Γ S∪T A ∧B,∆,∆′
Γ, A S ∆ Γ′, B T ∆′ ∨`
Γ′,Γ, A ∨B S∪T ∆,∆′
Γ S A,B,∆ `∨
Γ S A ∨B,∆
Γ, A S ∆ ¬¬`
Γ,¬¬A S ∆
Γ S A,∆ `¬¬
Γ S ¬¬A,∆
Γ,¬A S ∆ Γ′,¬B T ∆′ ¬∧`
Γ′,Γ,¬(A ∧B) S∪T ∆,∆′
Γ S ¬A,¬B,∆ `¬∧
Γ S ¬(A ∧B),∆
Γ,¬A,¬B S ∆ ¬∨`
Γ,¬(A ∨B) S ∆
Γ S ¬A,∆ Γ′ T ¬B,∆′ `¬∨
Γ′,Γ S∪T ¬(A ∨B),∆,∆′














Γ S ∆ LW
Γ, F S ∆
Γ S ∆ RW
Γ S F,∆
Γ S ∆ DE
Γ S∪T ∆
Logical Rules for D-wffs
Same as Logical Rules in SCS
Logical Rules for E-wffs
X S A1, . . . , An,∆ `?1†
X S∪{{A1},...,{An}} ?{A1, . . . , An},∆
Γ1, A1 S1 X1 . . .Γn, An Sn Xn ?`1†
Γ|n, ?{A1, . . . , An} S|n ∪{{A1},...,{An}} X|n
Γ1, ?[A|n] S [B|m],∆1 Γ2, B1 T1 Ai,∆2 . . .Γm+1, Bm Tm Aj ,∆m+1 `?2 ‡
Γ|m+1, ?[A|n] S∪T|m∪{{A1},...,{An}} ?[B|m],∆|m+1
Γ1, A1 S1 ?[B|m],∆1 . . . Γn, An Sn ?[B|m],∆n Γn+1, B1 T1 Ai,∆n+1 . . . Γn+m, Bm Tm Aj ,∆n+m ?`2‡
Γ|n+m, ?[A|n] S|n∪T|m∪{{A1},...,{An}} ?[B|m],∆|n+m
† Provided n > 1 and A1, . . . , An are non-equiform.
‡ Provided {Ai, . . . , Aj} ⊆ {A1, . . . , An}; m,n > 1 ; A1, . . . , An are pairwise non-equiform; and B1, . . . , Bn are pairwise
non-equiform.
Figure 2: Rules for SC?
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